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[This case note examines the decision of the High Court of Australia in Roads and Traffic Authority 
of New South Wales v Dederer, which marks the common law’s continued departure from shared 
liability for tragic accidents into the realm of personal liability. The decision has particular 
significance for children and young people who may be held accountable for their reckless actions, 
notwithstanding the ‘exuberance of youth’. In particular, the case note analyses the High Court’s 
emphasis on obvious risks and personal responsibility and the Court’s attempt to limit liability 
through a consideration of the plaintiff’s conduct on questions of the scope of the duty of care and at 
the breach of duty enquiry, rather than confining it to the issue of the plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
The case of Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer  
(‘Dederer’)1 involved a tragic event that regrettably occurs all too often in our 
society. It resonates not only with lawyers, but also with every parent, particu-
larly those of adolescent boys. The decision in Dederer illustrates the common 
law’s steady departure from shared liability for tragic accidents and its firm 
entrance into the realm of personal liability. In particular, Dederer emphasises a 
requirement for young people to be held accountable for their reckless actions, 
despite the effects of the ‘exuberance of youth’. 
The case concerned Phillip Dederer, the plaintiff, who was rendered partially 
paraplegic when he dived off the Forster-Tuncurry Bridge into a river in northern 
New South Wales.2 The accident occurred at about midday on New Year’s Eve, 
1998, during the school holidays when the plaintiff was 14 and a half years’ old.3 
The evidence established that the Roads and Traffic Authority of New South 
Wales (‘RTA’) was well aware of the dangerous behaviour that many young 
people engaged in, which was jumping from the bridge into the river below.4 
Despite this common practice having continued for many years, there had 
apparently been no record of injury in the 39 years since the bridge was built 
until the plaintiff’s fateful dive.5 
The decision of the majority of the High Court in Dederer that a minor should 
bear full responsibility for the consequences of this tragic accident represents a 
discernible shift in common law attitudes towards personal responsibility and 
liability in respect of accidents involving children and young people. In the past, 
the common law has demonstrated great flexibility in its willingness to accom-
modate the exuberance of youth through applying contributory negligence 
against a youthfully careless plaintiff.6 The common law has typically used such 
a finding of contributory negligence to apportion liability instead of using the 
plaintiff’s ignorance of a risk, which might be obvious to others, as a crucial 
determinant of the defendant’s liability. 
Certainly, there has been a general shift in recent years in the High Court’s 
attitude in favour of asserting personal responsibility and being more conserva-
tive in its approach to the question of liability in respect of risks which should be 
obvious to all plaintiffs.7 However, the cases that constitute this shift do not 
 
 1 (2007) 238 ALR 761. 
 2 Ibid 767–8 (Gummow J). 
 3 Ibid 783 (Kirby J). 
 4 Dederer v Roads and Traffic Authority (2005) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–792, 67 529 (Dunford J). 
 5 Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer (2006) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–860, 68 876 (Handley JA). 
 6 For cases involving the issue of contributory negligence and youthful plaintiffs, see, eg, 
Kelly v Bega Valley County Council (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, Glass, 
Hope and Samuels JJA, 13 September 1982) (‘Kelly’); Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 
CLR 258; Gunning v Fellows (1997) 25 MVR 97; Ryan v State Rail Authority of New South 
Wales [1999] NSWSC 1236 (Unreported, Dunford J, 16 December 1999); Sainsbury v Great 
Southern Energy Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 479 (Unreported, Barr J, 26 May 2000) (‘Sainsbury’); 
Traynor v Australian Capital Territory (2007) 214 FLR 416. 
 7 This ‘shift’ can be seen in the decisions of Romeo v Conservation Commission of the Northern 
Territory (1998) 192 CLR 431 (‘Romeo’); Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 
CLR 460 (‘Woods’); Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 
CLR 469; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422 (‘Vairy’); Mulligan v Coffs Har-
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focus on the age of the plaintiffs concerned.8 Furthermore, these High Court 
decisions have consistently failed to define how, and to what extent, obviousness 
of risk relates to the question of breach of duty on the one hand and contributory 
negligence on the other. 
There is also a growing tendency within the Court to use considerations of 
obviousness of risk and failure by plaintiffs to take care for their own safety in 
limiting the scope of a given duty of care, at least in respect of defendants who 
are statutory or road authorities or occupiers.9 This trend, if expanded to include 
all classes of defendants, would have a profound narrowing effect on the class of 
persons entitled to recover. 
Unfortunately, the majority’s decision in Dederer does not definitively resolve 
any of these issues. Instead, the majority of the High Court employed a technical 
dissection of the decisions below and almost overlooks the mitigating factor of 
age in its attempt to define more reasonable duties owed by defendants. 
I I   THE FACTS AND CASE HISTORY 
A  The Plaintiff ’s Claim 
The plaintiff claimed that the RTA had breached its duty of care to him by 
failing to warn him of the danger of the variable depth of the water below the 
bridge and by failing to install a redesigned railing along the side of the pedes-
trian walkway on the bridge.10 The RTA, being the statutory successor to the 
NSW Department of Main Roads (which initially constructed the bridge), 
maintained the bridge as part of a NSW main road.11  
The plaintiff argued that the bridge, as constructed and maintained, constituted 
a danger because the railings were horizontal (as opposed to vertical) with a flat 
top railing, making it relatively easy for persons to climb onto the railing and 
then to jump or dive into the river. Nevertheless, there were pictograph signs at 
either end of the bridge prohibiting diving which the plaintiff acknowledged 
having seen.12 The plaintiff claimed, however, that the signs were inadequate as 
they should have warned him of the dangers of the variable depth of the water 
below the bridge.13  
After commencing the original proceedings only against the RTA, the plaintiff 
subsequently joined the Great Lakes Shire Council to the proceedings on the 
basis that it was a roads authority, meaning that it had partial responsibility for 
 
bour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486 (‘Mulligan’); Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 222 ALR 631 
(‘Neindorf’). 
 8 The plaintiff in Romeo (1998) 192 CLR 431, 434 (Brennan CJ) was not quite 16 years’ old, 
though the plaintiffs in Woods (2002) 208 CLR 460, 467 (Gleeson CJ) and Vairy (2005) 223 
CLR 422, 473 (Callinan and Heydon JJ) were 32 and 33 years’ old respectively. 
 9 See, eg, Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512 (‘Brodie’); Romeo (1998) 192 
CLR 431. Cf Kirby J’s comments regarding ‘obviousness’ as directed towards breach of duty 
rather than scope of duty in Neindorf (2005) 222 ALR 631, 649–51. 
 10 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 789 (Kirby J), 814–15 (Callinan J). 
 11 Ibid 767–8 (Gummow J), 784 (Kirby J). 
 12 Ibid 768 (Gummow J), 786 (Kirby J), 808 (Callinan J). 
 13 Ibid 789 (Kirby J), 814 (Callinan J). 
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the bridge. In fact, some years prior to the plaintiff’s accident, the Council had 
erected the pictograph ‘no diving’ signs at either end of the bridge with the aid of 
funding from the RTA. Furthermore, Council rangers patrolled the area on and 
around the bridge from time to time.14 The Council was also aware of the 
widespread practice of young persons jumping and diving from the bridge, 
notwithstanding the presence of the signs and the activities of its rangers.15 
B  Tort Law Reform Legislation 
Interestingly, the recent tort law reform legislation — the Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW) — applied only to the case against the Council because the Council 
was joined to the proceedings after the Act had commenced. On the other hand, 
the proceedings against the RTA were brought before the commencement of the 
legislation. Consequently, the claim against the RTA was decided entirely on 
common law principles. In contrast, the case against the Council was determined 
on the basis of the legislation. On appeal, the case was ultimately decided in the 
Council’s favour. 
C  At Trial 
At first instance, the case was heard before Dunford J in the NSW Supreme 
Court.16 Although the plaintiff’s claim against both defendants was successful at 
this stage, his damages were reduced by 25 per cent for contributory negli-
gence.17 His Honour found that both the Council and the RTA knew of the 
frequency with which young persons jumped and dived off the bridge and that 
the bridge was an ‘allurement’ to young persons.18 His Honour also held that the 
RTA and the Council were negligent in their failure to warn the plaintiff of the 
danger of shallow water beneath the bridge.19 Furthermore, Dunford J held that 
the RTA’s failure to modify the bridge railings to make climbing onto and 
jumping off the bridge more difficult was also negligent.20 The RTA and the 
Council appealed the decision. 
D  NSW Court of Appeal 
The appeal by the Council was allowed on the basis that s 5L of the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW) afforded the Council a complete defence against the 
claim21 because the plaintiff was injured by ‘the materialisation of an obvious 
risk of a dangerous recreational activity’.22 
 
 14 Ibid 785 (Kirby J), 811–12 (Callinan J). 
 15 Ibid 769 (Gummow J). 
 16 Dederer v Roads and Traffic Authority (2005) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–792. 
 17 Ibid 67 534. 
 18 Ibid 67 530. 
 19 Ibid 67 531. 
 20 Ibid. 
 21 Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer (2006) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–860, 68 894–5 (Ipp JA). 
Tobias JA agreed: at 68 923. 
 22 Ibid 68 891 (Ipp JA). 
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Meanwhile, although the RTA’s appeal failed on the issue of liability, the Court 
of Appeal increased the reduction to the plaintiff’s damages for his contributory 
negligence to 50 per cent.23  
Ipp JA, with whom Tobias JA agreed (Handley JA dissenting), held that the 
RTA owed the plaintiff a general duty of care because it had ‘constructed the 
bridge and created the danger. The danger being the allurement to people, 
particularly children, to jump or dive off the railings’.24 
Ipp JA further found that the RTA exercised control over the bridge, was re-
sponsible for its maintenance, promoted pedestrian safety, erected signs on the 
bridge and knew that the pedestrian walkway attracted large numbers of people. 
Moreover, his Honour held that the RTA knew of the widespread practice of 
young people jumping and diving off the bridge:  
the serious risk of devastating injuries to those engaged in such activities must 
have been obvious to the RTA. The RTA knew or ought to have known that par-
ticularly in the summer months, jumping and diving was occurring with star-
tling frequency, involving at times, groups of young people every five or ten 
minutes, with a group capable of comprising 10 to 15 children aged 10 years to 
16 years.25 
The majority in the NSW Court of Appeal held that the RTA’s reliance on the 
‘no diving’ signs was, in all the circumstances of the case, an insufficient and 
unreasonable response to the risk of injury, particularly as the RTA knew that the 
signs were ignored by persons jumping off the bridge.26 A further response was 
required for the RTA to satisfy the reasonableness criterion, namely, signage 
which specifically referred to the possibility of shallow water27 as well as 
modification of the bridge railings to make climbing and diving more difficult.28 
In his dissenting judgment, Handley JA held that having regard to the 
state-wide road responsibilities of the RTA and the conflicting demands on 
allocation of resources, combined with the fact that the plaintiff was engaged in a 
risky activity, the RTA’s response to a risk which had not eventuated even once 
in 39 years was reasonable.29 The RTA then appealed to the High Court. 
E  The High Court 
The appeal by the RTA to the High Court was successful by a bare majority of 
three (Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ) to two (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J). In 
reaching their decision, the Court considered the nature and scope of the duty of 
care owed by a highway authority to pedestrian users of the roadway, as well as 
the appropriate standard of care owed to persons who fail to take care for their 
own safety. The Court also considered the question of when concurrent findings 
 
 23 Ibid 68 915. Tobias JA agreed: at 68 923. Handley JA similarly agreed on contributory 
negligence despite dissenting on other points: at 68 874. 
 24 Ibid 68 896 (Ipp JA). 
 25 Ibid 68 900. 
 26 Ibid 68 902. 
 27 Ibid 68 904–5 (Ipp JA). 
 28 Ibid 68 905–6 (Ipp JA). 
 29 Ibid 68 881–2. 
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of fact by trial and intermediate appellate courts should be reviewed by the High 
Court. 
1 The Majority View on the Issue of Liability of the RTA 
(a)  Scope of Duty  
Gummow J held that the RTA’s appeal should be allowed on the basis that both 
the trial judge and the NSW Court of Appeal had engaged in a ‘misapplication of 
basic and settled matters of legal principle.’30 Those principles were: 
First, the proper resolution of an action in negligence depends on the existence 
and scope of the relevant duty of care. Secondly, whatever its scope, a duty of 
care imposes an obligation to exercise reasonable care; it does not impose a 
duty to prevent potentially harmful conduct. Thirdly, the assessment of breach 
depends on the correct identification of the relevant risk of injury. Fourthly, 
breach must be assessed prospectively and not retrospectively. Fifthly, such an 
assessment of breach must be made in the manner described by Mason J in 
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt.31 
Gummow J held that while the RTA owed the plaintiff a duty of care, that duty 
involved a particular and defined legal obligation arising out of a relationship 
between the parties.32 After referring to the reasons in Sullivan v Moody,33 
Gummow J pointed out that ‘[t]he law now recognises certain types of loss and 
kinds of relationships which are different from those of earlier days.’34 More-
over, his Honour held that the effect of the decision in Brodie v Singleton Shire 
Council  (‘Brodie’)35 was that a roads authority is obliged to exercise reasonable 
care so that the road is safe ‘for users exercising reasonable care for their own 
safety’.36  
His Honour noted that this expression of the limitation of the scope of the duty 
owed to those exercising care for their own safety ‘has long antecedents in the 
law relating to occupiers’ liability.’37 Gummow J also cited the more recent 
authorities of Romeo v Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory 
(‘Romeo’)38 and Neindorf v Junkovic (‘Neindorf’)39 for the principle as it applies 
to occupiers’ liability. 
In his judgment, his Honour appeared careful not to expand this limited scope 
of duty beyond those defendants to whom he specifically referred. However, it is 
tempting to conclude that this kind of duty-limiting approach might represent a 
 
 30 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 767. 
 31 Ibid (citations omitted). 
 32 Ibid 773. 
 33 (2001) 207 CLR 562. 
 34 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 773. 
 35 (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
 36 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 773 referring to Brodie (2001) 206 CLR 512, 581 (Gaudron, 
McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
 37 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 773 referring to Indermaur v Dames (1866) LR 1 CP 274, 288 
(Willes J). 
 38 (1998) 192 CLR 431. 
 39 (2005) 222 ALR 631. 
     
2008] Case Note 745 
     
further progression of the common law’s tendency to impose ‘personal responsi-
bility’, in line with much of Australian’s recent tort law reform legislation.40 
There are, of course, authorities which stand for the opposite proposition — 
that defendants must, in some circumstances, specifically take account of the 
possibility that others might themselves be negligent.41 This would place the 
possibility of a plaintiff behaving negligently within the class of reasonably 
foreseeable risks that some defendants must be concerned about, and therefore 
such risks fall within the scope of the duty of care. This principle was applied in 
the case of an employer in McLean v Tedman.42 The High Court then extended 
this principle in Bus v Sydney County Council ,  stating that a duty to a person 
who might ‘inadvertently or negligently injure himself if the duty is breached is 
not unique to employment situations.’43 The Court pointed out that ‘[c]ases of 
occupiers’ liability frequently concern injury involving the inadvertence of the 
person present on the land concerned’.44 
Whilst Gummow J did not advert to these authorities, he nevertheless qualified 
his statement as to the limited scope of the RTA’s duty in Dederer by stating: 
Of course, the weight to be given to an expectation that potential plaintiffs will 
exercise reasonable care for their own safety is a general matter in the assess-
ment of breach in every case, but in the present case it was also a specific ele-
ment contained, as a matter of law, in the scope of the RTA’s duty of care.45 
His Honour clarified this issue of the scope of the RTA’s duty of care by saying 
that 
[t]he RTA’s duty of care was owed to all users of the bridge, whether or not 
they took ordinary care for their own safety; the RTA did not cease to owe Mr 
Dederer a duty of care merely because of his own voluntary and obviously dan-
gerous conduct in diving from the bridge. However, the extent of the obligation 
owed by the RTA was that of a roads authority exercising reasonable care to see 
that the road is safe ‘for users exercising reasonable care for their own safety’. 
The essential point is that the RTA did not owe a more stringent obligation to-
wards careless road users as compared with careful ones. In each case, the same 
obligation of reasonable care was owed, and the extent of that obligation was to 
be measured against a duty whose scope took into account the exercise of rea-
sonable care by road users themselves.46 
 
 40 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 
1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). 
 41 McLean v Tedman (1984) 155 CLR 306, 311–12 (Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ); 
Bus v Sydney County Council (1989) 167 CLR 78, 90 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Too-
hey JJ); March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 519–20 (Deane J), 536–7 
(McHugh J); Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423, 431 (Mason CJ, Deane, 
Dawson and Gaudron JJ). 
 42 (1984) 155 CLR 306, 312–13 (Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ). Gibbs CJ agreed with 
the judgment (at 307) despite disagreeing on the point of contributory negligence. 
 43 (1989) 167 CLR 78, 90 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
 44 Ibid. See also Cooper v Southern Portland Cement Ltd (1972) 128 CLR 427, 449 (Barwick CJ). 
 45 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 773 (citations omitted). 
 46 Ibid 774 (citations omitted). 
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One interpretation of his Honour’s comments is that there is a telescoping of 
the notion of a plaintiff’s obligation to take care for their own safety into both the 
scope of duty and the breach enquiries. This raises some important questions. If 
such an obligation to take care is a defining matter on the issue of the scope of 
the duty of care, why is it not open to a defendant to argue that it owes no duty at 
all to a plaintiff who has not exercised reasonable care? Is negligence on the part 
of the plaintiff then capable of taking the plaintiff outside the class of persons to 
whom a duty of care is owed? If this were the case, contributory negligence 
could serve to disqualify a plaintiff altogether from recovery47 and render 
apportionment legislation48 effectively worthless.  
Gummow J plainly states in the extract above that this is not the case — that 
the plaintiff’s own negligence will not negate the duty of care. Yet if, as a matter 
of law, the scope of the duty is defined by reference only to those plaintiffs who 
take reasonable care for their own safety, it is conceivable that there may be 
cases where a negligent plaintiff will fail on the duty of care issue, before the 
breach question is even considered. For Gummow J, the issue of the plaintiff’s 
failure to take care for his own safety was a crucial consideration in determining 
the scope of the duty of care. Is there then a possibility that the scope of the duty 
might be so limited as to preclude a finding of a duty at all?  
(b)  Obvious Risks 
In several Australian jurisdictions, tort law reform legislation precludes liabil-
ity being owed to plaintiffs who are injured by the materialisation of obvious 
risks while engaging in dangerous recreational activities.49 Indeed, a provision to 
that effect50 defeated Dederer’s claim against the Great Lakes Shire Council,51 
which had been joined as a defendant in the plaintiff’s original proceedings. By 
limiting the scope of any duty of care owed to persons who take such risks, is it 
possible that the common law is developing towards the same legislative end in 
respect of obvious risks? 
In Dederer, Gummow J did not specifically deal with the issue of ‘obvious 
risk’ and its relevance to the breach of duty enquiry at common law. Instead, he 
explicitly considered obviousness of risk on the scope of duty question in relation 
 
 47 This is the case under tort law reform legislation in several states where provisions have been 
enacted to the effect that courts may reduce damages by 100 per cent for contributory negli-
gence: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 47; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5S; Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 24; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 63. 
 48 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 
(NSW); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT); Law Reform (Tortfeasors Con-
tribution, Contributory Negligence and Division of Chattels) Act 1953 (Qld); Law Reform (Con-
tributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA); Tortfeasors and Contribu-
tory Negligence Act 1954 (Tas); Wrongs (Contributory Negligence) Act 1951 (Vic); Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) s 4. In Queensland, the 
legislation on the apportionment of liability in contributory negligence is now contained in pt III 
of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld); in Victoria it is now pt IVAA of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); 
and in Tasmania it is now s 4 of the Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas). 
 49 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5L; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 19; Recreational Services 
(Limitation of Liability) Act 2002 (SA) s 7; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 20; Civil Liability Act 
2002 (WA) s 5H. 
 50 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5L. 
 51 Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer (2006) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–860, 68 884 (Ipp JA). 
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to the plaintiff’s failure to take care for his own safety. Gummow J refers to the 
plaintiff’s ‘own voluntary and obviously dangerous conduct in diving from the 
bridge’52 and it was this conduct which his Honour held limited the scope of the 
duty owed.  
There has been significant debate within the High Court in recent years as to 
whether the obviousness of risk should be a factor specifically limiting the scope 
of a duty of care, or whether it should be considered simply as one of the factors 
going to breach of duty or, alternatively, whether it should be confined to 
considerations of contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part.53 
In Romeo, a majority of the High Court considered the ‘obviousness of the 
risk’ as one factor going to the breach of duty question.54 They held that the 
public authority concerned was not negligent in failing to warn of the danger of 
a cliff edge or to take steps to avoid it because the danger would have been 
obvious to users of the reserve, making it reasonable to expect that entrants 
would exercise reasonable care for their own safety.55 Kirby J held: 
While account must be taken of the possibility of inadvertence or negligent 
conduct on the part of entrants, the occupier is generally entitled to assume that 
most entrants will take reasonable care for their own safety … Where a risk is 
obvious to a person exercising reasonable care for his or her own safety, the no-
tion that the occupier must warn the entrant about the risk is neither reasonable 
nor just.56 
Similarly, in Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (‘Woods’), the majority of 
the High Court regarded the ‘obviousness of the risk’ of injury from a cricket 
ball to the eye as but one factor to be taken into account as part of the wider 
breach of duty enquiry.57 
The cases of Vairy v Wyong Shire Council  (‘Vairy’)58 and Mulligan v Coffs 
Harbour City Council  (‘Mulligan’)59 both concerned a plaintiff who had 
suffered serious spinal injury after diving into water of unknown depth. In each 
case the statutory authority, having control of the relevant swimming spot, was 
held not to have breached its duty of care by failing to warn of the danger or to 
otherwise avoid it. In Vairy, Gleeson CJ, Kirby, McHugh, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ all held that the obviousness of risk was one factor to be considered on 
the issue of breach of duty. They were not of the opinion that the obviousness of 
risk alone could ever be ‘necessarily determinative of questions of breach of 
duty’.60 However, Callinan and Heydon JJ took a much narrower view in 
 
 52 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 774. 
 53 See, eg, Romeo (1998) 192 CLR 431; Woods (2002) 208 CLR 460; Brodie (2001) 206 CLR 512; 
Thompson v Woolworths (Q’Land) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; Vairy (2005) 223 CLR 422; 
Mulligan (2005) 223 CLR 486. 
 54 (1998) 192 CLR 431, 447 (Brennan CJ), 455–6 (Toohey and Gummow JJ), 491 (Hayne J). 
 55 Ibid 481 (Kirby J). 
 56 Ibid 478 (citations omitted). 
 57 (2002) 208 CLR 460, 474 (Gleeson CJ), 504 (Hayne J), 509–10 (Callinan J). 
 58 (2005) 223 CLR 422. 
 59 (2005) 223 CLR 486. 
 60 Vairy (2005) 223 CLR 422, 441 (Gummow J). See also at 427 (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J), 438–9 
(McHugh J), 479 (Hayne J). 
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Mulligan and held that ‘obviousness may be of such significance and impor-
tance, indeed of such a very high degree of importance as to be overwhelmingly 
so, and effectively conclusive in some cases.’61 
In contrast, McHugh J sounded a note of caution in Vairy and adverted to a 
more traditional approach when he stated that ‘[t]he obviousness of the risk goes 
to the issue of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, rarely to the discharge of 
the defendant’s duty.’62 Similarly, Hayne J stated that ‘the focus of inquiry [at the 
breach of duty stage] must remain upon the putative tortfeasor, not upon the 
person who has been injured’.63  
Kirby J’s judgment in Neindorf, a case concerning the liability of a private 
occupier of a dwelling house to entrants, contains some telling comments 
concerning the recent developments in the High Court’s attitude to obvious risks. 
In particular, his Honour refers to the fact that ‘passages appear in many judicial 
reasons to the effect that, in defining the standard of care in a particular case, it is 
appropriate to take into account whether the suggested risk is “obvious”.’64 His 
Honour specifically refers to his own judgment in Romeo and points out that the 
danger of placing so much emphasis on suggested obviousness is that, in a 
given case, it will distort proper consideration of a defence of contributory neg-
ligence. It will take that factor of alleged carelessness on the part of the plaintiff 
up into the negation of a breach of duty, instead of reaching it at the conclusion 
of conventional negligence analysis. 
The mischief of this approach, which is spreading like wildfire through the 
courts of this land and must be arrested if proper negligence doctrine is to be 
restored, is that it can effectively revive the ancient common law position so 
that effectively, contributory negligence, of whatever proportion, becomes 
again a complete defence to an action framed in negligence … 
If I could expunge the quoted passage from my reasons in Romeo, I would 
gladly do so. I would take it out, not because it was incorrect as a factual ob-
servation in the context of that case but because it has been repeatedly de-
ployed by courts as an excuse to exempt those with greater power, knowledge, 
control and responsibility over risks from a duty of care to those who are vul-
nerable, inattentive, distracted and more dependent.65 
So the approach of the High Court to obviousness of risk is by no means 
settled. Certainly in the case of Dederer, obviousness of risk can be identified 
clearly as the decisive issue defining the scope of the duty of care owed to the 
plaintiff by the RTA, and subsequently affecting the breach of duty question. 
(c)  Breach of Duty 
Having dealt with the complex issue of the scope of the duty of care, Gum-
mow J then considered the question of the relevant standard of care expected of 
the RTA. He emphasised that the standard required of a defendant is to take 
 
 61 Mulligan (2005) 223 CLR 486, 509. 
 62 Vairy (2005) 223 CLR 422, 438. 
 63 Ibid 470. 
 64 Ibid 649 (citations omitted). 
 65 Ibid 650–1 (citations omitted). 
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reasonable care, rather than to prevent injury.66 His Honour held that this 
‘orthodox approach’ was not adopted at trial or in the Court of Appeal.67 He 
noted that the trial judge and the majority in the Court of Appeal concentrated on 
the failure of the signs on the bridge to prevent people from diving and jumping 
from it.68 The majority in the Court of Appeal concluded that it was unreasonable 
for the RTA to do nothing in response to the ‘well-known practice of children 
jumping from the bridge in defiance of “No Diving” signs’.69 Gummow J held 
that this approach was erroneous, and that as long as the RTA had exercised 
reasonable care it would not be liable even if the risky behaviour were to 
continue.70 His Honour stated that ‘[e]ven reasonable warnings can “fail”’71 and 
held that the majority of the Court of Appeal had  
impermissibly reasoned that if a warning is given, and if the conduct against 
which that warning is directed continues … then the party who gave the warn-
ing is shown to have been negligent by reason of the warning having failed.72  
This reasoning, his Honour held, ‘short-circuits the inquiry into breach of duty 
that is required by Shirt’.73  
Gummow J further held that the trial judge and the Court of Appeal had incor-
rectly characterised the risk to the plaintiff as being a risk of serious spinal injury 
caused by diving from the bridge.74 His Honour held that this view of the risk 
obscured the real source of the injury, which was not the state of the bridge but 
instead the plaintiff’s own conduct in jumping into potentially shallow water and 
risking impact. This distracted the majority from a proper assessment of the 
probability of the risk eventuating and also led to attributing to the RTA a greater 
control over the situation than it actually had. Gummow J held that the risk of 
injury had a low probability of occurring and that the RTA had no control over 
the plaintiff’s activity or the variations in depth of the river.75 
Gummow J also found that the trial judge and the majority in the Court of 
Appeal did not engage in an assessment of breach of duty on the part of the RTA 
prospectively, but rather from a position of hindsight, that is, by ‘retrospectively 
asking whether the defendant’s actions could have prevented the plaintiff’s 
injury.’76 His Honour held that the lower courts had focused in retrospect on the 
defendant’s failure to prevent the plaintiff’s dive, rather than asking what the 
exercise of reasonable care would have required prospectively in response to the 
foreseeable risk of injury. 
Ultimately on the issue of breach, Gummow J held that the risk was plainly 
foreseeable, but that the RTA had acted reasonably in doing nothing more than it 
 
 66 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 775. 
 67 Ibid. 
 68 Ibid 776–7. 
 69 Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer (2006) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–860, 68 920 (Tobias JA). 
 70 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 776. 
 71 Ibid 777. 
 72 Ibid. 
 73 Ibid (referring to Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1979) 146 CLR 40 (‘Shirt’)). 
 74 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 778. 
 75 Ibid. 
 76 Ibid 779. 
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had already done in response to the risk. His Honour held that the risk, though of 
grave injury, had a low probability of occurring. Furthermore, the plaintiff had 
provided little evidence that he would have complied with further signs; more-
over, modification of the railings was of doubtful utility and would have 
involved significant expense.77 Accordingly, his Honour concluded that the RTA 
had not breached its duty of care to the plaintiff.78 
Using the ‘Shirt calculus’, Callinan J, like Gummow J, considered that the 
RTA had discharged its duty of care to the plaintiff. In the opinion of Callinan J, 
both the trial judge and the majority in the Court of Appeal had ‘erred, by failing 
to undertake this balancing exercise in a sufficient and proper way’.79 Notwith-
standing that it was a risk of grave injury, his Honour specifically drew attention 
to the very low probability of the realisation of the risk of injury, the community 
interests to be balanced against redesign of the bridge, and the improbability that 
a differently worded sign would have deterred the plaintiff’s behaviour. 
Callinan J also held that a defendant is not an insurer, in the sense that a duty of 
care is not an absolute duty to prevent injury; rather, a defendant must respond to 
a risk reasonably.80 His Honour considered that: 
A proper balancing exercise which takes all of the relevant circumstances into 
account leads inescapably to the conclusion that the appellant, in responding to 
a risk that had not been realised for 40 years, by erecting the pictograph signs, 
acted reasonably and adequately.81 
Heydon J expressly agreed with the reasons of Gummow J on the question of 
the liability of the RTA.82 
2 The Dissentient View on the Issue of Liability of the RTA 
Kirby J, with whose reasons Gleeson CJ agreed, held in dissent that the deci-
sion of the trial judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal on the issues of the 
defendant’s negligence and causation should stand.83 Kirby J held that those 
conclusions contained no error of fact or law on the part of the Court of Appeal 
that would justify disturbance by the High Court.84 
As to the evidence, Kirby J held that it was open to the trial judge to find that 
the RTA knew of the dangerous practice of diving from the bridge and to accept 
the plaintiff’s own evidence at trial as to the deterrent effect upon him of a sign 
warning of the danger of shallow water.85 Kirby J noted that these findings of 
fact presented a serious obstacle to the defendant obtaining a different conclusion 
 
 77 Ibid 781–2. 
 78 Ibid 782. 
 79 Ibid 825. 
 80 Ibid 826. 
 81 Ibid. 
 82 Ibid. 
 83 Ibid 798 (Kirby J), 766 (Gleeson CJ). 
 84 Ibid 794, 798, 800, 802–3 (Kirby J). 
 85 Such a statement by a plaintiff after the event as to what the plaintiff would have done had the 
defendant not been negligent would now be inadmissible in NSW: Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW) s 5D(3). 
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from an appellate court, where the appellate court did not have the benefit of 
hearing directly from the plaintiff.86 
On the issue of breach of duty of care, Kirby J referred to the High Court’s 
recent decision in New South Wales v Fahy,87 where the ‘Shirt calculus’ was 
reaffirmed. He stressed that there is 
an emphasis on the nuanced character of the approach explained in Shirt; the 
fact that the formula there stated is not mathematical in its application; and the 
fact that it permits a decision-maker, considering what a reasonable person 
would do by way of response to a foreseeable risk, to reach a conclusion that, 
in the particular circumstances of the case, it might indeed be that ‘nothing’ or 
nothing more is required.88  
Kirby J concluded that the Court of Appeal’s application of the ‘Shirt calculus’ 
was correct and that there was no indication in the majority reasons that ‘any of 
the strictures against mechanistic reasoning or hindsight analysis’ had been 
overlooked.89 His Honour considered in detail the leading judgment of Ipp JA in 
the Court of Appeal and all the evidence upon which Ipp JA had concluded that 
the RTA’s response to the risk was unreasonable. Kirby J concluded that it was 
well open to the majority in the Court of Appeal to agree with the primary judge, 
concluding that the RTA was in breach of its duty.90  
On the issue of causation, Kirby J held that the findings of the primary judge, 
who had the advantage of the plaintiff’s own oral evidence, should stand. His 
Honour clearly stated that appellate courts should have no ‘exaggerated defer-
ence to trial assessments which reasonably appear to defy appellate common-
sense.’91 Nevertheless, he found that in the present case there was no error in the 
approach of the Court of Appeal, which had carefully considered both the factual 
findings of the trial judge and the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s 
dive.92 Accordingly, Kirby J held that the plaintiff’s judgment against the RTA 
should stand. 
I I I   THE ALLUREMENT FACTOR 
The question of whether the way in which the bridge was constructed consti-
tuted an ‘allurement’ to young people was a relevant consideration to both the 
issues of duty and breach of duty, at trial and also in the Court of Appeal. 
At trial, Dunford J held: 
The bridge, being a launching pad for jumping or diving into generally clear 
water at a holiday resort, particularly in summer was, I believe, a very strong 
 
 86 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 799. 
 87 (2007) 232 CLR 486. 
 88 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 794–5 (citations omitted). 
 89 Ibid 795. 
 90 Ibid 798. 
 91 Ibid 799. 
 92 Ibid 800. 
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allurement to youths of the plaintiff’s age group, particularly as in a colloquial, 
though not accurate, sense, ‘everybody else’ was doing it.93 
In the Court of Appeal, Ipp JA considered ‘allurement’ on the question of duty 
of care whilst looking at many factors: for example, the construction of the 
bridge so as to create the danger; the ‘allurement’ presented by the bridge; the 
RTA’s maintenance and regular inspections of the bridge; and, most influentially, 
the RTA’s control of the bridge.94 His Honour regarded all these factors as 
influential on the duty of care question, but also held that the fact that the bridge 
was an allurement to young people was a relevant consideration on the issue of 
breach of duty.95 His Honour referred to his own judgment in Edson v Roads and 
Traffic Authority of New South Wales,96 with which Beazley JA and Hunt AJA 
agreed: 
Where the exigencies of life and human nature combine to cause large numbers 
of persons to take grave risks in utilising areas under the control of a statutory 
authority, the community expects that the authority itself will take reasonable 
steps to limit the harm likely to result. It was the very function of the RTA, after 
all, to promote traffic safety.97  
The issue of ‘allurement’ has been a significant consideration in a number of 
cases over the last four decades,98 particularly on the question of the comparative 
culpability between plaintiff and defendant for the purpose of determining the 
extent of the reduction in damages for contributory negligence.99 For example, in 
Commonwealth v Introvigne,100 Murphy J held that a school authority was not 
only negligent in failing to supervise the 15-year-old plaintiff who was swinging 
on a school flagpole,101 but that the flagpole itself was a ‘lure’.102  
In Sainsbury v Great Southern Energy Pty Ltd (‘Sainsbury’),103 Barr J dis-
cussed the different ways of measuring the comparative negligence of parties as 
identified by Glass JA in Kelly v Bega Valley County Council (‘Kelly’).104 ‘The 
first three factors were the intrinsic danger of the activity under examination, its 
 
 93 Dederer v Roads and Traffic Authority (2005) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–792, 67 530. 
 94 Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer (2006) Aust Torts Reports ¶81−860, 68 896. 
 95 Ibid 68 901. 
 96 (2006) 65 NSWLR 453. 
 97 Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer (2006) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–860, 68 901, citing his own 
judgment in Edson v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 65 NSWLR 453, 
469−70. 
 98 See, eg, Munnings v Hydro-Electric Commission (1971) 125 CLR 1; Common-
wealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; Kelly (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, 
Glass, Hope and Samuels JJA, 13 September 1982); Sainsbury [2000] NSWSC 479 (Unre-
ported, Barr J, 26 May 2000). 
 99 Interestingly, Dunford J, the trial judge in Dederer, also presided in the earlier case of 
Ryan v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [1999] NSWSC 1236 (Unreported, Dunford J, 
16 December 1999) [17], where the ‘allurement’ factor was held to be a relevant consideration in 
the determination of contributory negligence involving a 13-year-old boy. 
100 (1982) 150 CLR 258. 
101 Ibid 275. 
102 Ibid 276. 
103 [2000] NSWSC 479 (Unreported, Barr J, 26 May 2000). 
104 (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, Glass, Hope and Samuels JJA, 13 September 
1982) 10 (Glass JA). 
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duration and the maturity of the actor.’105 The fourth factor was whether the 
‘defendant’s default constituted an allurement which in a real sense provoked 
and facilitated the default of the plaintiff.’106  
In Sainsbury, a 12-year-old boy suffered injuries by electrocution after he 
climbed an electricity pole in a park reserve and touched an electricity wire.107 
The boy had unfortunately believed that he needed to touch two electricity wires 
to get hurt. In finding the energy company liable for the accident and setting the 
boy’s contribution at 10 per cent,108 Barr J referred to the four factors identified 
by Glass JA in Kelly. In relation to the first factor, his Honour noted that the 
defendant’s act ‘was a special undertaking which transmitted electricity at lethal 
voltages through a public park provided for the recreation of members of the 
public, including children.’109 His Honour found that the defendant ‘owed a 
responsibility to all those who used the reserve to carry electricity safely’ and 
that it had failed ‘in its duty to do so.’110 By contrast, Barr J reasoned that the 
‘plaintiff’s default endangered only himself.’111 In relation to the second factor, 
his Honour noted that while the defendant’s default was longstanding, the 
‘plaintiff’s default was short-lived and impulsive.’112 As to the third factor, his 
Honour stated that while the ‘defendant’s default was that of a mature man 
knowing all the dangers of the carriage of lethal voltages of electricity in the 
circumstances’, the plaintiff was an ‘immature’ 12-year-old boy.113 In relation to 
the fourth factor, ‘allurement’, Barr J held that the ‘defendant’s default consti-
tuted an allurement which actually provoked and facilitated the plaintiff’s 
default.’114 Indeed, his Honour went further and described the power pole, and 
the lack of guard rails preventing access, as promoting a ‘positive encourage-
ment to climb.’115 
In contrast to these earlier authorities, Gummow J’s judgment in Dederer is 
particularly dismissive of the ‘allurement’ factor, describing the continued use of 
the term ‘as a factual epithet [that] tends to conceal more than it reveals’: 
First, ‘allurement’ might be used to indicate no more than that many people 
have encountered the risk, thus leading to a conclusion one way or another 
about the probability of that risk eventuating. Secondly, the term might focus 
attention on the responsibility of the defendant for creating the risk, or for en-
couraging or enticing people into a dangerous situation. However, in the pre-
sent case the RTA did not create the risk of shallow water of variable depth, nor 
did it exhort or encourage young people to dive from the bridge. Thirdly, the 
term might simply indicate the factual proposition that the particular location or 
 
105 Sainsbury [2000] NSWSC 479 (Unreported, Barr J, 26 May 2000) [12]–[15]. 
106 Ibid [16]. 
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activity was attractive to certain kinds of people. Such an observation is of no 
legal consequence.116  
Callinan J was also dismissive of the bridge being cast as an ‘allurement’ that 
the defendant should have rectified: 
The [plaintiff] was engaged in an activity of a purely recreational kind. The 
thrill of making, as he did, a high dive which he knew to be banned must have 
been an attraction for him. To say, as if it were an answer, that the bridge was 
therefore an allurement which the defendants should, on that account, have rec-
tified is to cease the inquiry at, or to treat as effectively decisive, the state of 
affairs antecedent to the first respondent’s entirely voluntary, and premeditated, 
prohibited act of diving. But even so, it is something of an exaggeration to de-
scribe a perfectly orthodox bridge constructed to endure for many years, and in 
accordance with the standards of the time, as an allurement, as if, because 
youths were accustomed to misuse it, it should be modified to put beyond all 
chance that they would do so in the future.117 
In contrast, Kirby J agreed with Ipp JA’s assessment in the Court of Appeal 
that the design of the bridge’s railing ‘afforded an allurement to children tempted 
to use that railing as a platform for entry into the water.’118 He found that 
although the proposed relatively inexpensive modification to the railing would 
not have prevented access to the water from the bridge, it would have assisted in 
diminishing or removing any encouragement to use the rail as a diving plat-
form.119 Additionally, Kirby J referred to Ipp JA’s endorsement of the suggestion 
that the horizontal railings on the bridge ‘should have been removed and 
replaced with vertical pool-type railings’, at least in the area known to have been 
an allurement.120 
In dismissing the appeal, Kirby J found that: 
With respect, I do not agree that an allurement to children is a defendant’s re-
sponsibility only if that party encourages the alluring feature. This is not how 
allurement has been dealt with in the past. Allurements often arise in run-down, 
abandoned or disused premises. The question is not one of encouragement. It is 
one of foresight and responsibility.121 
Consequently, as far as the majority of the current High Court is concerned, 
the ‘allurement factor’ may have reached its ‘use-by date’ as an independent 
factor for consideration. 
IV  CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
While the High Court majority in Dederer did not need to consider the ques-
tion of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, Kirby J, having decided to allow 
 
116 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 779. 
117 Ibid 826 (citations omitted). 
118 Ibid 797 (citations omitted), referring to Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer (2006) Aust Torts 
Reports ¶81–860, 68 905. 
119 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 797. 
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the defendant’s appeal, did consider the role of an appellate court in reviewing 
apportionment ordered for contributory negligence at trial.122 
The discount for contributory negligence in Dederer was assessed by the trial 
judge as 25 per cent.123 The Court of Appeal increased the apportionment to 50 
per cent.124 Kirby J observed that it is generally accepted that a trial judge, 
having heard all the evidence, will be in a better position than an appellate court 
to make an ‘evaluative and multi-factorial’ decision on apportionment.125 
Nevertheless, his Honour held that an intermediate appellate court must dis-
charge its own functions of appellate review and so is obliged to substitute its 
own decision for that of the lower court where error is shown in the apportion-
ment.126 Kirby J concluded that the Court of Appeal had engaged in a ‘painstak-
ing examination of the facts’127 and all the judges considered that the trial judge 
had erred. His Honour stated: 
Although Mr Dederer was only fourteen and a half years of age, the evidence 
showed that he was an experienced diver. He would have known that a safe 
dive always requires water of adequate depth. He acknowledged that, notwith-
standing visual inspection and the recollection of seeing other children entering 
the water, he was not aware of the actual depth into which he plunged. He was 
aware of the signs placed on the bridge and of the prohibition which each en-
tailed. While the standard of care that could be expected of him was only that 
of an ordinary person of his age, even a much younger Australian child with 
less experience of diving would have known that serious risks were involved in 
proceeding as Mr Dederer did.128 
This view of the High Court and the Court of Appeal represents a relatively 
high standard of care to be expected of an adolescent boy and a departure from 
traditional notions of a minor’s contributory negligence which have allowed for 
the exuberance of youth. 
In the past, the courts have tended to take a fairly lenient view of the culpabil-
ity of negligent children and adolescents when applying apportionment legisla-
tion. They appear to have developed some fine calibrations along the ‘gauge’ of 
contributory negligence in order to accommodate the inattention or foolishness 
of children and young persons. Commonly, the bar has appeared to be set 
relatively low in recognition of youthful exuberance, with findings of more than 
25 per cent contributory negligence against a child plaintiff relatively rare.129 
 
122 Ibid 801–3. 
123 Dederer v Roads and Traffic Authority (2005) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–792, 67 534 (Dunford J). 
124 Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer (2006) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–860, 68 915 (Ipp JA). 
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125 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 802. 
126 Ibid referring to Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, 127–8 (Gleeson, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
127 Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 802. 
128 Ibid 803. 
129 Consideration of a selection of cases illustrates this point: Kelly (Unreported, New South Wales 
Court of Appeal, Glass, Hope and Samuels JJA, 13 September 1982) 1, 10 (Glass JA) involved 
an 11-year-old boy who was electrocuted upon entering a council sub-station, the result being a 
25 per cent reduction for contributory negligence; Gunning v Fellows (1997) 25 MVR 97, 97–8, 
100 (Beazley JA) involved a 12-year-old boy who was injured in a collision with a car while 
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In cases such as Kelly and Sainsbury, the courts have been at pains to consider 
the impulsiveness, immaturity, inexperience and lack of foresight of children 
when making a comparison between the culpability of an adult or corporate 
defendant, and that of a child plaintiff. These matters have been addressed 
overtly by the courts, resulting in accommodations for children that would not 
and clearly should not, be applicable to adults. However, Dederer’s case repre-
sents an apparently higher expectation of youthful responsibility than that which 
has been applied in the past. 
The same general notions of personal responsibility that are embodied in the 
tort law reform legislation in Australian jurisdictions have undoubtedly had some 
influence on the courts in applying the common law. Several of those deal with 
contributory negligence and, in particular, some tort law reforms reverse the 
previous common law position130 by providing that contributory negligence may 
result in a 100 per cent reduction in the plaintiff’s damages.131 Such radical 
alterations to the common law position must reflect a widespread change in 
community values. Perhaps we are already seeing that change in attitude 
reflected in increased findings of contributory negligence against young persons 
at common law. 
The finding by the High Court majority in Dederer (and one dissenting justice 
in the NSW Court of Appeal) that this minor should shoulder full responsibility 
for the tragic accident in this case appears somewhat harsh. The plaintiff’s 
actions were certainly foolish, but they were the actions of a boy not yet old 
enough to vote, obtain a driver’s licence or even leave school. While there have 
been examples of children as young as 12 being held fully responsible for their 
own actions,132 this is generally due to a finding of a lack of ‘foreseeability of 
risk’ by a defendant. Given the evidence that the RTA had known for many years 
 
gence; Ryan v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [1999] NSWSC 1236 (Unreported, 
Dunford J, 16 December 1999) [1], [41] involved a 13-year-old boy who was injured jumping 
onto a moving train, the result being a 33 per cent reduction for contributory negligence; Sains-
bury [2000] NSWSC 479 (Unreported, Barr J, 26 May 2000) [1], [2], [18] involved a 
12-year-old boy who was electrocuted after climbing upon an electricity pole, the result being a 
10 per cent reduction for contributory negligence; Goode v Thompson (2001) Aust Torts Reports 
¶81–617, 67 153, 67 160 (Ambrose J) involved a 12-year-old boy who was hit by a car while 
crossing a road, the result being a 20 per cent reduction for contributory negligence; Chotiputh-
silpa v Waterhouse [2005] NSWCA 295 (Unreported, Beazley, Giles and Ipp JJA, 2 September 
2005) [1], [4], [94] involved a 16-year-old boy who was hit by a car crossing Sydney’s Anzac 
Bridge, the result being a 60 per cent reduction for contributory negligence; Edson v Roads and 
Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 65 NSWLR 453, 454, 477 (Ipp JA) involved a 
13-year-old girl who was hit by two cars crossing Sydney’s F5 freeway, the result being a 40 per 
cent reduction for contributory negligence; and Traynor v Australian Capital Territory [2007] 
ACTSC 38 (Unreported, Connolly J, 18 June 2007) [1], [115] involved an 11-year-old boy who 
was injured in a collision with a car when riding his bicycle onto a road from a cycle path, the 
result being a 10 per cent reduction for contributory negligence. 
130 See, eg, Wynbergen v Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd (1997) 149 ALR 25, 28–30 (Hayne J), in which 
it was held that s 10 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) does not 
permit the apportionment of 100 per cent responsibility to one party to the exclusion of respon-
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131 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 47; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5S; Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 24; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 63. 
132 See, eg, McLellan v Queensland Rail [2001] QCA 487 (Unreported, McMurdo P, McPherson JA 
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that both adults and children were using a particular part of the bridge as a diving 
platform, one would have thought that foresight, rather than hindsight, should 
have led to modification of the bridge structure to prevent improper or dangerous 
use. Although the view of the majority would have merit with respect to the 
actions of competent adults, it is of concern that children and young people may 
be expected, in such situations, to show ‘a degree of sense and circumspection 
which nature ordinarily withholds till life has become less rosy.’133 
V  CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF  FACT AND THE ROLE OF  AN 
APPELLATE COURT 
A separate but important issue addressed by the High Court in Dederer was 
that of the circumstances in which a final or second appellate court might disturb 
concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts. 
There are various High Court authorities which recognise a ‘rule’ concerning 
the approach of second appellate courts to concurrent findings of fact.134 The 
issue was considered definitively by the High Court for the first time in 1928 in 
Major v Bretherton, where Isaacs J used the word ‘rule’ to describe the approach 
to be taken, stating: 
I do not mean that as soon as I see there are concurrent findings I abstain from 
forming my own opinion. I am bound to consider the evidence and to form my 
own opinion consistently with judicial obligation and precedent. But when I 
have done so, the rule comes into play, and, unless I reach the point of clear 
conviction predicated by the House of Lords in the P Caland Case, the appeal 
should, in my opinion, fail.135 
Gleeson CJ agreed with Kirby J’s dissenting judgment in Dederer that the 
findings of the Court of Appeal on issues of negligence and causation should not 
be overturned.136 In his judgment, the Chief Justice focused on the crucial issue 
of whether a final appellate court should overturn findings on negligence and 
causation made by the trial judge, as well as by the Court of Appeal. The Chief 
Justice was adamant that the function of the High Court ‘as a second appellate 
court and a court of final resort, is not simply to give a well-resourced litigant a 
third opportunity to persuade a tribunal to take a view of the facts favourable to 
that litigant.’137 
Gleeson CJ relied on the principle that an appellate court should not disturb 
concurrent findings of two lower courts except where there are special reasons 
for doing so, such as injustice or clear error. He referred to the many authorities 
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that underpin this longstanding principle,138 pointing out that, in most Australian 
jurisdictions a decision on the issue of negligence in a claim for personal injury 
would historically have been made by a civil jury as the tribunal of fact.139 Such 
a finding would, of course, not easily be reviewed by an appellate court.140 
Today, issues of negligence are decided by the trial judge, who delivers a 
judgment setting out reasons, which makes appellate review possible. Appellate 
courts in turn set out full reasons. The Chief Justice argued that, in the interests 
of finality, a second appellate court, while not abdicating its own responsibilities, 
must be clearly convinced of error before it should disturb concurrent findings of 
fact.141 
In contrast, Gummow J was of the opinion that the errors in the lower courts in 
Dederer did not turn on issues of fact about which reasonable minds might 
differ.142 Rather, his Honour characterised the errors in the courts below as errors 
in the application of settled law. Accordingly, his Honour was not concerned 
about the matters on which Gleeson CJ based his judgment. 
On the question of the appropriate role of an appellate court, Callinan J con-
sidered both s 73 of the Australian Constitution and s 35AA of the Judiciary Act 
1908 (Cth), which imposed ‘at least as heavy an obligation to dispose of appeals 
to it on their legal and factual merits as an intermediate appellate court.’143 His 
Honour emphasised that in all the cases cited by the Chief Justice as authority for 
the ‘concurrent findings principle’, there is no reference to the enactments under 
which the various appeals were brought. Nor has any distinction been made in 
those authorities between appeals on questions of law, and appeals on questions 
of fact.144 Callinan J further observed that in the present case there were no 
primary factual matters of substance in dispute between the parties, either at first 
instance or on appeal. His Honour noted ironically that the ‘key inferential 
matter of fact’ — being the issue of what an adequate warning sign should have 
said — was not a matter on which there had been concurrent findings.145 
While Heydon J agreed with the judgment of Gummow J in relation to the 
substance of the appeal,146 he cast doubt on the applicability of the ‘concurrent 
findings principle’ to the High Court. Heydon J held that in the present case, the 
courts below had not made ‘concurrent findings of fact’ in such a way as to 
inhibit the High Court from allowing the appeal.147 Moreover, his Honour listed 
six non-concurrent or ‘discordant’ findings of the lower courts in Dederer which 
were in relation to measures that the RTA should have taken to discharge its duty 
of care.148 His Honour also pointed out that the non-concurrent findings in 
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Dederer consisted of ‘discordance on issues not directly material to the question 
… [of] breach … but factually closely related to that question’.149  
Referring to the judgment of Deane J in Louth v Diprose,150 Heydon J opined 
that 
it is understandable that a third court might feel trepidation in disagreeing with 
factual findings on which all the judges of two other courts have already 
agreed: but it is difficult to understand the trepidation in cases like the present, 
where the courts below not only did not agree, but were at odds on almost 
every crucial issue except the ultimate issue of whether there had been a breach 
of duty.151  
Heydon J recognised the importance of minimising the costs of administration 
of justice as well as the need to ensure practical equality before the law, but 
nonetheless held that such considerations should not stand in the way of appel-
late correction of erroneous conclusions.152 Heydon J referred to two proposi-
tions advocated by Deane J in Louth v Diprose, namely, that ‘the concurrent 
findings principle applies even if the courts below differ in their reasoning, and 
even if there is a dissentient in the first appellate court.’153 Heydon J referred to 
Devi v Roy,154 the Privy Council authority for those propositions, and stated: 
It must be seriously doubted whether it is right for this court to adopt for itself a 
rule of conduct which the board laid down without reference to any statutory 
provision, at least without counsel appearing before this court, and the court it-
self, conducting a close analysis of the constitutional and statutory provisions 
concerning appeals to this court in a case in which the existence or 
non-existence of the supposed concurrent findings principle is crucial to the 
outcome.155 
Heydon J concluded by deciding that even if the ‘concurrent findings princi-
ple’ was to be treated as a rule of law until it is examined more closely in the 
future, the exception to the rule — that it does not apply if there is a clear 
conviction that the findings are erroneous — would apply in the present case.156 
Although Kirby J would have dismissed the appeal, he agreed with the ap-
proach adopted by Heydon J on the question of concurrent findings of fact.157 
Kirby J held that neither a principle of law nor judicial practice stands in the way 
of the High Court’s jurisdiction and power ‘to reach, and give effect to, contrary 
factual conclusions.’158 His Honour was of the opinion, however, that ‘more than 
a passing nod is required to a sense of “trepidation” against interfering in 
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concurrent findings of fact’,159 and that ‘a clear case of error is needed for 
interference in concurrent findings of fact made below.’160 
VI  A TREND IDENTIFIED 
Dederer represents another example in the High Court’s trend towards a more 
restrictive attitude to the finding of liability in the tort of negligence. Kirby J 
made several telling observations regarding the decision of the majority of the 
High Court to allow the appeal by the RTA on the issue of liability: 
All that has occurred is the substitution of different factual opinions, in har-
mony with a trend that I have earlier called to notice. That trend reflects a re-
treat from communitarian concepts of mutual legal responsibility and from 
concern with accident prevention. It evidences an attitude to the claims of 
plaintiffs and to the law of negligence that I cannot share.161  
His Honour had previously referred to such a trend in the recent cases of 
Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd162 and New South 
Wales v Fahy.163 In Neindorf, Kirby J opined: 
Changing attitudes in this court to the content of the common law of negligence 
have resulted in a discernible shift in the outcomes of negligence cases. Ac-
cording to Professors Skene and Luntz, ‘[t]he common law, as emanating from 
the High Court of Australia, was already moving to a much more restrictive at-
titude towards the tort of negligence’. Now the shift has been accelerated by 
statute.164  
This trend shows no signs of abating and, given the emphasis on individual 
responsibility evident in tort law reforms in all Australian jurisdictions in recent 
years, it seems likely to continue. 
VII   CONCLUSION 
Dederer is certainly a case which brings these restrictive changes to the com-
mon law into stark relief. The emphasis on obvious risks and personal responsi-
bility is necessitated by the High Court’s attempt to limit liability through a 
consideration of the plaintiff’s conduct on the question of scope of duty at the 
breach enquiry, rather than on the question of contributory negligence. Confining 
these issues to the question of scope of duty may result in a severe limitation of 
recourse to damages for those plaintiffs most in need. The approach of the 
majority in the High Court to ensure that a defendant’s liability is limited in 
terms of reasonable prospective foresight by having regard to obvious risks is 
laudable. However, there is a wider policy issue of balancing the liability of 
public authorities in negligence against plaintiffs who require care after a tragic 
accident caused by youthful exuberance. The High Court’s move away from a 
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focus on public and community responsibility for negligently caused harm and 
toward renewed emphasis on the same notion of individual responsibility made 
explicit by recent tort law reform legislation is not only discernible, but palpable. 
In every respect, the decision in Dederer represents an acceptance of a far 
more qualified view of negligence law than has been evident in the past. The 
combination of the narrow definition of the scope of the duty of care, the 
application of the ‘Shirt calculus’ so as to include considerations of the plaintiff’s 
conduct at the breach of duty enquiry, and the disregard for the plaintiff’s youth 
and inexperience all point to an expectation of individual responsibility which 
diminishes the value and role of the law of negligence. 
